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Physicians' action to declare unconstitutional
portions of laws prohibiting assisted suicide
presented justiciable case or controversy, even
though physicians allegedly did not face
prosecution, where one of the physicians had
criminal proceeding instituted against him in the
past, and state did not disclaim intent to repeat
prosecution in event of further assisted suicides,
and the other two physicians also faced threat
of criminal prosecution; further, physicians may
raise rights of their terminally-ill patients.

80 F.3d 716
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Timothy E. QUILL, M.D.; Samuel
C. Klagsbrun, M.D.; and Howard A.
Grossman, M.D., Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
Dennis C. VACCO, Attorney General of the State of
New York; George E. Pataki, Governor of the State of
New York; Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney
of New York County, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 60, Docket 95–7028. | Argued
Sept. 1, 1995. | Decided April 2, 1996.

2 Cases that cite this headnote
[2]

Constitutional Law
Fundamental rights
92 Constitutional Law
92VII Constitutional Rights in General
92VII(A) In General
92k1052 Fundamental rights
(Formerly 92k82(1))

Physicians brought action challenging constitutionality of
New York statutes making it a crime to aid a person in
committing a suicide or attempting to commit suicide. On
physicians' motion for summary judgment, the District Court,
Griesa, Chief Judge, 870 F.Supp. 78, entered summary
judgment dismissing physicians' action. They appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) case
presented justiciable controversy; (2) there is no fundamental
right to assisted suicide; and (3) laws prohibiting assisted
suicide violated Equal Protection Clause of United States
Constitution.

Rights that have no textual support in language
of Constitution but qualify for heightened
judicial protection include fundamental liberties
so implicit in concept of ordered liberty that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed.
Cases that cite this headnote

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
[3]
Calabresi, Circuit Judge, concurred in the result in a separate
opinion.

92 Constitutional Law
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92VII(A) In General
92k1053 Strict or heightened scrutiny;
compelling interest
(Formerly 92k82(1))
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Constitutional Law
Strict or heightened scrutiny; compelling
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State must not infringe fundamental liberty
interests unless infringement is narrowly tailored
to serve compelling state interest.
Cases that cite this headnote
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92VII(B) Particular Constitutional Rights
92k1088 Suicide
(Formerly 92k82(6.1))

Fundamental rights
92 Constitutional Law
92VII Constitutional Rights in General
92VII(A) In General
92k1052 Fundamental rights
(Formerly 92k82(1))

Rights that Supreme Court has actually
or impliedly identified as fundamental, and
therefore qualified for heightened judicial
protection, include the fundamental guarantees
of the Bill of Rights as well as freedom
of association right to participate in electoral
process and to vote right to travel interstate,
the right to fairness in the criminal process,
right to procedural fairness in regard to claims
for governmental deprivations of life, liberty or
property; right to privacy.

There is no fundamental right to assisted suicide,
even in the very limited cases of mentally
competent persons who, in final stages of
terminal illness, seek the right to hasten death.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
6 Cases that cite this headnote
[7]

92 Constitutional Law
92VI Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions
92VI(C) Determination of Constitutional
Questions
92VI(C)3 Presumptions and Construction as to
Constitutionality
92k1006 Particular Issues and Applications
92k1021 Equal protection
(Formerly 92k48(6))
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Constitutional Law
Sex and Procreation
Constitutional Law
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92 Constitutional Law
92XI Right to Privacy
92XI(B) Particular Issues and Applications
92k1237 Sex and Procreation
92k1238 In general
(Formerly 92k82(10))
92 Constitutional Law
92XI Right to Privacy
92XI(B) Particular Issues and Applications
92k1247 Family Law; Marriage
92k1248 In general
(Formerly 92k82(10))

“Right of privacy” has been held to encompass
personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, family relationships, child rearing
and education, contraception and abortion.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
Cases that cite this headnote
[6]

Constitutional Law
Suicide
92 Constitutional Law

Constitutional Law
Equal protection

Under Equal Protection Clause, general rule
is that state legislation carries presumption of
validity if statutory classification is rationally
related to legitimate state interest. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
2 Cases that cite this headnote
[8]

Constitutional Law
Differing levels set forth or compared
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVI Equal Protection
92XXVI(A) In General
92XXVI(A)6 Levels of Scrutiny
92k3051 Differing levels set forth or compared
(Formerly 92k215, 92k213.1(2))

While rational basis scrutiny governs judicial
review of constitutionality of legislation in areas
of social welfare and economics, strict scrutiny
is standard of review where classification
impermissibly interferes with exercise of
fundamental right, which is right explicitly or
implicitly derived from the Constitution itself,
or operates to peculiar disadvantage of suspect
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class, which is class identified by race, alienage
or national origin. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
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Constitutional Law
Illegitimacy
Constitutional Law
Sex or gender
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVI Equal Protection
92XXVI(A) In General
92XXVI(A)6 Levels of Scrutiny
92k3069 Particular Classes
92k3074 Illegitimacy
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92XXVI Equal Protection
92XXVI(A) In General
92XXVI(A)6 Levels of Scrutiny
92k3069 Particular Classes
92k3081 Sex or gender
(Formerly 92k224(1), 92k213.1(1))

To pass intermediate level of scrutiny,
which applies in analyzing certain equal
protection guarantee violations resulting from
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy, the
classification must be substantially related to
an important governmental objective. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
1 Cases that cite this headnote
[10]

Constitutional Law
Death and suicide
Suicide
Advising, aiding, or agreeing to commit
92 Constitutional Law
92XXVI Equal Protection
92XXVI(E) Particular Issues and Applications
92XXVI(E)18 Privacy and Sexual Matters
92k3767 Death and suicide
(Formerly 92k225.1)
368 Suicide
368k3 Advising, aiding, or agreeing to commit

Statutes prohibiting persons in final stages of
terminal illness from having assistance in ending

their lives by use of self-administered, prescribed
drugs lack any rational basis and violate Equal
Protection Clause; New York does not treat
similarly circumstanced persons alike in that
those in final stages of terminal illness who are
on life-support systems are allowed to hasten
their deaths by directing the removal of such
systems, but those who are similarly situated,
except for previous attachment of life-sustaining
equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by
self-administering prescribed drugs, and state
does not have any apparent interest in requiring
the prolongation of a life that is all but ended.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; N.Y.McKinney's
Penal Law §§ 120.30, 125.15, subd. 3.
10 Cases that cite this headnote

*717 Appeal from summary judgment for defendants
entered in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Griesa, Ch. J.) in action to declare
unconstitutional two New York statutes penalizing assistance
in suicide to extent that the statutes prohibit physicians
from acceding to *718 requests of terminally-ill, mentally
competent patients for drugs to hasten death.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Kathryn L. Tucker, Perkins Coie, Seattle, WA, and Carla A.
Kerr, Hughes Hubbard & Reed, New York City (David J.
Burman, Thomas L. Boeder, Kari Anne Smith, Perkins Coie,
Seattle, WA, Leigh A. Roveda, Hughes Hubbard & Reed,
New York City, of counsel), for Plaintiffs–Appellants.
Michael Popkin, Assistant Attorney General, New York
City (Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of the State of
New York, Victoria Graffeo, Solicitor General, Kathie Ann
Whipple, Acting Bureau Chief, Litigation Bureau, Susan
L. Watson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for
Defendants–Appellees.
Marc Frazier Scholl, Assistant District Attorney, New York
City (Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney of New
York County, Marc Dwyer, Assistant District Attorney, of
counsel), for Defendant–Appellee Robert M. Morgenthau.
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(Michael L. Costello, New York State Catholic Conference,
Albany, NY, Mark E. Chopko, Michael F. Moses, United
States Catholic Conference, Washington, DC, of counsel),
for United States Catholic Conference and New York State
Catholic Conference as amici curiae.
(Michael Tierney, New York City, of counsel), for New York
State Right to Life Committee, Inc. as amicus curiae.
(James Bopp, Jr., Richard E. Coleson, Bopp, Coleson &
Bostrom, Terre Haute, IN, of counsel), for The National Right
To Life Committee, Inc. as amicus curiae.
(Paul Benjamin Linton, Clarke D. Forsythe, Americans
United for Life, Chicago, IL, of counsel), for Members of the
New York State Legislature as amici curiae.
(Cameron Clark, Claudia L. Hammerman, New York City,
of counsel), for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc., National Association of People with AIDS, Unitarian
Universalist Association, Americans for Death with Dignity,
Death with Dignity Education Center, Gray Panthers Project
Fund, Hemlock Society, and Minna Barrett as amici curiae.
Before MINER and CALABRESI, Circuit Judges, and
POLLACK, Senior District Judge. *
*

The Honorable Milton Pollack of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York,
sitting by designation.

Opinion
MINER, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs-appellants Timothy E. Quill, Samuel C. Klagsbrun
and Howard A. Grossman appeal from a summary judgment
entered in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Griesa, Ch. J.) dismissing their
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against defendants-appellees. The
action was brought by plaintiffs-appellants, all of whom
are physicians, to declare unconstitutional in part two New
York statutes penalizing assistance in suicide. The physicians
contend that each statute is invalid to the extent that it
prohibits them from acceding to the requests of terminally-ill,
mentally competent patients for help in hastening death. In
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees,
the district court considered and rejected challenges to

the statutes predicated upon the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F.Supp. 78
(S.D.N.Y.1994). We reverse in part, holding that physicians
who are willing to do so may prescribe drugs to be selfadministered by mentally competent patients who seek to end
their lives during the final stages of a terminal illness.

BACKGROUND
The action giving rise to this appeal was commenced by
a complaint filed on July 20, 1994. The plaintiffs named
in that complaint were the three physicians who are the
appellants here and three individuals then in the final stages
of terminal illness: Jane Doe (who chose to conceal her actual
identity), George A. Kingsley and William A. Barth. The sole
defendant named in that complaint was G. Oliver Koppell,
then the Attorney *719 General of the State of New York.
He has been succeeded as Attorney General by Dennis C.
Vacco, who has been substituted for him as an appellee on
this appeal. According to the complaint, Jane Doe was a 76–
year–old retired physical education instructor who was dying
of thyroid cancer; Mr. Kingsley was a 48–year–old publishing
executive suffering from AIDS; and Mr. Barth was a 28–
year–old former fashion editor under treatment for AIDS.
Each of these plaintiffs alleged that she or he had been advised
and understood that she or he was in the terminal stage of
a terminal illness and that there was no chance of recovery.
Each sought to hasten death “in a certain and humane manner”
and for that purpose sought “necessary medical assistance in
the form of medications prescribed by [her or his] physician
to be self-administered.”
The physician plaintiffs alleged that they encountered, in
the course of their medical practices, “mentally competent,
terminally ill patients who request assistance in the voluntary
self-termination of life.” Many of these patients apparently
“experience chronic, intractable pain and/or intolerable
suffering” and seek to hasten their deaths for those reasons.
Mr. Barth was one of the patients who sought the assistance
of Dr. Grossman. Each of the physician plaintiffs has alleged
that “[u]nder certain circumstances it would be consistent
with the standards of [his] medical practice” to assist in
hastening death by prescribing drugs for patients to selfadminister for that purpose. The physicians alleged that they
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were unable to exercise their best professional judgment to
prescribe the requested drugs, and the other plaintiffs alleged
that they were unable to receive the requested drugs, because
of the prohibitions contained in sections 125.15(3) and 120.30
of the New York Penal Law, all plaintiffs being residents of
New York.
Section 125.15 of the New York Penal Law provides in
pertinent part:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree
when:
....
3. He intentionally ... aids another person to commit
suicide.
A violation of this provision is classified as a class C felony.
Id.
Section 120.30 of the New York Penal Law provides:
A person is guilty of promoting
a suicide attempt when he
intentionally ... aids another person to
attempt suicide.
A violation of this provision is classified as a class E felony.
Id.
Count I of the complaint included an allegation that “[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the liberty of mentally
competent, terminally ill adults with no chance of recovery to
make decisions about the end of their lives.” It also included
an allegation that
[t]he
Fourteenth
Amendment
guarantees the liberty of physicians to
practice medicine consistent with their
best professional judgment, including
using their skills and powers to
facilitate the exercise of the decision
of competent, terminally ill adults to
hasten inevitable death by prescribing
suitable medications for the patient to
self-administer for that purpose.

Count II of the complaint included an allegation that
[t]he relevant portions of ... the
New York Penal Law deny the
patient-plaintiffs and the patients
of the physician-plaintiffs the equal
protection of the law by denying
them the right to choose to hasten
inevitable death, while terminally ill
persons whose treatment includes
life support are able to exercise
this choice with necessary medical
assistance by directing termination of
such treatment.
In their prayer for relief the plaintiffs requested
judgment declaring the New York statutes complained of
constitutionally invalid and therefore in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 “as applied to physicians who assist mentally
competent, terminally ill adults who choose to hasten
inevitable death.” Plaintiffs also sought an order permanently
enjoining defendants from enforcing the statutes and an award
of attorney's fees.
By order to show cause filed on September 16, 1994, the
plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin thenAttorney General Koppell “and all persons acting in *720
concert and participation with him from enforcing New York
Penal Law sections 125.15(3) and 120.30 against physicians
who prescribe medications which mentally competent,
terminally ill patients may use to hasten their impending
deaths.” A declaration by each of the plaintiffs was submitted
in support of the application, although Jane Doe had died prior
to the filing of the order to show cause. Plaintiffs Kingsley and
Barth were then in the advanced stages of AIDS and therefore
sought an immediate determination by the district court.
In her declaration, Jane Doe stated:
I have a large cancerous tumor which
is wrapped around the right carotid
artery in my neck and is collapsing my
esophagus and invading my voice box.
The tumor has significantly reduced
my ability to swallow and prevents
me from eating anything but very thin
liquids in extremely small amounts.
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The cancer has metastasized to my
plural [sic] cavity and it is painful to
yawn or cough.... In early July 1994 I
had the [feeding] tube implanted and
have suffered serious problems as a
result.... I take a variety of medications
to manage the pain.... It is not possible
for me to reduce my pain to an
acceptable level of comfort and to
retain an alert state.... At this time, it
is clear to me, based on the advice of
my doctors, that I am in the terminal
phase of this disease.... At the point
at which I can no longer endure the
pain and suffering associated with my
cancer, I want to have drugs available
for the purpose of hastening my death
in a humane and certain manner. I
want to be able to discuss freely with
my treating physician my intention
of hastening my death through the
consumption of drugs prescribed for
that purpose.
Mr. Kingsley subscribed to a declaration that included the
following:
At this time I have almost no immune
system function.... My first major
illness associated with AIDS was
cryptosporidiosis, a parasitic infection
which caused me severe fevers and
diarrhea and associated pain, suffering
and exhaustion.... I also suffer from
cytomegalovirus (“CMV”) retinitis, an
AIDS-related virus which attacks the
retina and causes blindness. To date I
have become almost completely blind
in my left eye. I am at risk of losing my
sight altogether from this condition....
I also suffer from toxoplasmosis, a
parasitic infection which has caused
lesions to develop on my brain....
I ... take daily infusions of cytovene
for the ... retinitis condition. This
medication, administered for an hour
through a Hickman tube which is

connected to an artery in my chest,
prevents me from ever taking showers
and makes simple routine functions
burdensome. In addition, I inject my
leg daily with neupogen to combat the
deficient white cell count in my blood.
The daily injection of this medication
is extremely painful.... At this point it
is clear to me, based on the advice of
my doctors, that I am in the terminal
phase of [AIDS].... It is my desire that
my physician prescribe suitable drugs
for me to consume for the purpose of
hastening my death when and if my
suffering becomes intolerable.
In his declaration, Mr. Barth stated:
In May 1992, I developed a Kaposi's
sarcoma skin lesion. This was my
first major illness associated with
AIDS. I underwent radiation and
chemotherapy to treat this cancer....
In September 1993, I was diagnosed
with cytomegalovirus (“CMV”) in
my stomach and colon which caused
severe diarrhea, fevers and wasting....
In February 1994, I was diagnosed
with microsporidiosis, a parasitic
infection for which there is effectively
no treatment.... At approximately
the same time, I contracted AIDSrelated pneumonia. The pneumonia's
infusion therapy treatment was so
extremely toxic that I vomited with
each infusion.... In March 1994, I
was diagnosed with cryptosporidiosis,
a parasitic infection which has
caused severe diarrhea, sometimes
producing 20 stools a day, extreme
abdominal pain, nausea and additional
significant wasting. I have begun to
lose bowel control.... For each of
these conditions I have undergone a
variety of medical treatments, each
of which has had significant adverse
side effects.... While *721 I have
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tolerated some [nightly intravenous]
feedings, I am unwilling to accept this
for an extended period of time.... I
understand that there are no cures....
I can no longer endure the pain and
suffering ... and I want to have drugs
available for the purpose of hastening
my death.
A cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings was filed by
Attorney General Koppell on October 11, 1994. Thereafter,
on October 14, 1994, an amended complaint was filed by
the three physicians and Mr. Kingsley naming as defendants
Attorney General Koppell and New York State Governor
Mario M. Cuomo. The counts of the complaint were the same
as set forth in the original complaint, alleging violations of
liberty interests guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment in
Count I and violation of equal protection rights guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment in Count II. The prayer
for relief remained the same as in the original complaint.
Supplemental declarations in support of the plaintiff's motion
for preliminary injunction also were filed on October 14,
1994. In their supplemental declarations, Doctors Klagsbrun
and Grossman reiterated their desire “to prescribe drugs, if
and when medically and psychiatrically appropriate, for such
patients to self-administer at the time and place of their choice
for the purpose of hastening their impending deaths.”
In his supplemental declaration, Dr. Quill declared:
The removal of a life support
system that directly results in the
patient's death requires the direct
involvement by the doctor, as
well as other medical personnel.
When such patients are mentally
competent, they are consciously
choosing death as preferable to life
under the circumstances that they
are forced to live. Their doctors
do a careful clinical assessment,
including a full exploration of
the patient's prognosis, mental
competence to make such decisions,
and the treatment alternatives to
stopping treatment. It is legally and
ethically permitted for physicians

to actively assist patients to die
who are dependent on life-sustaining
treatments.... Unfortunately, some
dying patients who are in agony
that can no longer be relieved, yet
are not dependent on life-sustaining
treatment, have no such options under
current legal restrictions. It seems
unfair, discriminatory, and inhumane
to deprive some dying patients of
such vital choices because of arbitrary
elements of their condition which
determine whether they are on lifesustaining treatment that can be
stopped.
Along with the supplemental declarations filed on October
14th, an original declaration in support of the motion was
filed by Dr. Jack Froom, a physician and Professor of Family
Medicine with substantial experience in detecting depression
in primary care patients. He declared:
Physicians can determine whether a
patient's request to hasten death is
rational and competent or motivated
by depression or other mental illness
or instability. Physicians currently
make these determinations as to
patient capacity to make end-of-life
decisions with respect to orders not
to resuscitate and refusal of lifesustaining treatment.... Terminally ill
persons who seek to hasten death
by consuming drugs need medical
counseling regarding the type of
drugs and the amount and manner
in which they should be taken, as
well as a prescription, which only a
licensed medical doctor can provide....
Knowing what drug, in what amount,
will hasten death for a particular
patient, in light of the patient's medical
condition and medication regimen, is
a complex medical task.... It is not
uncommon, in light of present legal
constraints on physician assistance,
that patients seeking to hasten their
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deaths try to do so without medical
advice.... Very often, patients who
survive a failed suicide attempt find
themselves in worse condition than
before the attempt. Brain damage, for
example, is one result of failed suicide
attempts.
A second amended complaint was filed on October 20, 1994.
The parties, allegations and prayer for relief were the same
as those contained in the first amended complaint, except
that Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney of New York
County, was added as a defendant in his official capacity.
Both Dr. Grossman and Dr. Klagsbrun practice medicine
*722 in New York City, and Mr. Morgenthau is responsible
for the prosecution of crimes occurring in New York County.
The physician plaintiffs each filed second supplemental
declarations on November 28, 1994, in support of the
motion for a preliminary injunction. Each stated that he was
currently treating mentally competent, terminally-ill patients
who desired to hasten their deaths by self-administering drugs
to be provided by the physicians “if and when medically
and psychiatrically appropriate.” These patients, according
to the physicians, understood “their condition, diagnosis,
and prognosis and wish[ed] to avoid prolonged suffering by
hastening their deaths if and when their suffering [became]
intolerable.” None of the three terminally-ill plaintiffs named
in the original complaint survived to the date of the district
court's decision.
The opinion of the district court was filed on December 16,
1994. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary
injunction and granted the defendants' cross motion to dismiss
the action, treating the cross motion as one for summary
judgment “since the court has considered matters outside
the pleadings—i.e., declarations filed on the motion for
preliminary injunction.” Quill, 870 F.Supp. at 79. After
finding that the action presented a justiciable case or
controversy, the district court first addressed the due process
issue. The court determined that physician assisted suicide
could not be classified as a fundamental right within the
meaning of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court has described the considerations which
are appropriate before there can be a declaration that rights
“not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text” are
deserving of constitutional protection. Such rights must be

implicit in the concept of ordered liberty so that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. The
Supreme Court has also characterized such rights as those
liberties that are deeply rooted in the nation's history and
traditions.
The trouble is that plaintiffs make no attempt to argue that
physician assisted suicide, even in the case of terminally ill
patients, has any historic recognition as a legal right.
Id. at 83 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the district
court concluded “that the type of physician assisted suicide
at issue in this case does not involve a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. at 84.
Turning to the equal protection issue, the district court
identified a reasonable and rational basis for the distinction
drawn by New York law between the refusal of treatment at
the hands of physicians and physician assisted suicide:
[I]t is hardly unreasonable or irrational
for the State to recognize a difference
between allowing nature to take its
course, even in the most severe
situations, and intentionally using an
artificial death-producing device. The
State has obvious legitimate interests
in preserving life, and in protecting
vulnerable persons. The State has the
further right to determine how these
crucial interests are to be treated when
the issue is posed as to whether
a physician can assist a patient in
committing suicide.
Id. at 84–85. Accordingly, the court held “that plaintiffs have
not shown a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 85.

DISCUSSION
I. Justiciability
As they did in the district court, the state defendants contend
on appeal that this action does not present a justiciable case
or controversy. We reject this contention.
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In Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S.
289, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979), the Supreme
Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to an Arizona
farm labor statute. The Court stated that, when contesting the
constitutionality of a state criminal statute, it is not necessary
that the plaintiff first expose himself to actual prosecution. Id.
at 298, 99 S.Ct. at 2308–09. Rather,
[w]hen the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in
a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional
interest, *723 but proscribed by a statute, and there exists
a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he “should not
be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as
the sole means of seeking relief.”
Id. (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188, 93 S.Ct.
739, 745, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973)). The Court in Doe
held that plaintiff physicians had presented a justiciable
controversy despite the fact that none had been threatened
with prosecution. 410 U.S. at 188, 93 S.Ct. at 745–46. The
law that the physicians challenged was a criminal statute
that directly criminalized the physician's participation in
abortion. Accordingly, a sufficiently concrete controversy
was presented.
[1] The same principles lead to the conclusion that there
is a case or controversy at issue here. Dr. Quill has had a
criminal proceeding instituted against him in the past, and the
state nowhere disclaims an intent to repeat a prosecution in
the event of further assisted suicides. The other two physician
plaintiffs also face the threat of criminal prosecution. Like the
physicians in Doe, they “should not be required to await and
undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking
relief.” Finally, under Doe, the physicians may raise the rights
of their terminally-ill patients. See id.
Although District Attorney Morgenthau argues in his brief
on appeal that appellants have not shown that they are in
any jeopardy of prosecution in New York County, a recent
indictment by a New York County grand jury demonstrates
the contrary. A newspaper report printed on December 15,
1995 disclosed the following:
Yesterday, District Attorney Robert
M. Morgenthau of Manhattan
announced that a grand jury had
indicted [George] Delury, an editor

who lives on the Upper West Side,
on manslaughter charges for helping
his 52–year–old wife, Myrna Lebov,
commit suicide last summer.
Carey Goldberg, Suicide's Husband Is Indicted; Diary
Records Pain of 2 Lives, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1995, at B1. 1
The physician plaintiffs have good reason to fear prosecution
in New York County.
1

On March 15, 1996, Delury pleaded guilty to seconddegree attempted manslaughter. Pam Belluck, Man Will
Get Prison Term for Helping His Wife Kill Herself, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 16, 1996, at 23, 26.

II. Substantive Due Process
Plaintiffs argue for a right to assisted suicide as a fundamental
liberty under the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Clause assures
the citizenry that any deprivation of life, liberty or property
by a state will be attended by appropriate legal processes.
However,
despite the language of the Due
Process Clause[ ] of the ... Fourteenth
Amendment[ ], which appears to
focus only on the processes by which
life, liberty, or property is taken,
the cases are legion in which th[at]
Clause [ ] ha[s] been interpreted to
have substantive content, subsuming
rights that to a great extent are
immune from ... state regulation or
proscription. Among such cases are
those recognizing rights that have
little or no textual support in the
constitutional language.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191, 106 S.Ct. 2841,
2844, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986).
[2] [3] [4] [5] Rights that have no textual support in
the language of the Constitution but qualify for heightened
judicial protection include fundamental liberties so “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty” that “neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82
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L.Ed. 288 (1937). Fundamental liberties also have been
described as those that are “deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition.” Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1938, 52 L.Ed.2d 531
(1977); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
506, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1693–94, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (White,
J., concurring). It is well settled that the state must not
infringe fundamental liberty interests unless the infringement
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Reno
v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–03, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 1447,
123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). The list of rights the Supreme Court
has actually or impliedly *724 identified as fundamental,
and therefore qualified for heightened judicial protection,
include the fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights as
well as the following: freedom of association; the right to
participate in the electoral process and to vote; the right
to travel interstate; the right to fairness in the criminal
process; the right to procedural fairness in regard to claims
for governmental deprivations of life, liberty or property;
and the right to privacy. 2 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E.
Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 15.7, at 434–36 (2d
ed.1992). The right of privacy has been held to encompass
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, family
relationships, child rearing and education, contraception and
abortion. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
684–85, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2015–16, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977).
While the Constitution does not, of course, include any
explicit mention of the right of privacy, this right has been
recognized as encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. Id. at 684, 97 S.Ct. at 2015–16.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to further
expand this particular list of federal rights, and it would be
most speculative for a lower court to do so. See Rotunda
& Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law, supra, § 15.7, at
433–37.
[6] In any event, the Supreme Court has drawn a line,
albeit a shaky one, on the expansion of fundamental rights
that are without support in the text of the Constitution. In
Bowers, the Supreme Court framed the issue as “whether
the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the
laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal
and have done so for a very long time.” 478 U.S. at 190,
106 S.Ct. at 2843. Holding that there was no fundamental
right to engage in consensual sodomy, the Court noted that
the statutes proscribing such conduct had “ancient roots.” Id.

at 192, 106 S.Ct. at 2844–45. The Court noted that sodomy
was a common law criminal offense, forbidden by the laws
of the original 13 states when they ratified the Bill of Rights,
and that 25 states and the District of Columbia still penalize
sodomy performed in private by consenting adults. Id. at 192–
93, 106 S.Ct. at 2844–46.
As in Bowers, the statutes plaintiffs seek to declare
unconstitutional here cannot be said to infringe upon any
fundamental right or liberty. As in Bowers, the right
contended for here cannot be considered so implicit in our
understanding of ordered liberty that neither justice nor
liberty would exist if it were sacrificed. Nor can it be said
that the right to assisted suicide claimed by plaintiffs is
deeply rooted in the nation's traditions and history. Indeed,
the very opposite is true. The Common Law of England, as
received by the American colonies, prohibited suicide and
attempted suicide. See Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide:
A Constitutional Right?, 24 Duq. L.Rev. 1, 56–67 (1985).
Although neither suicide nor attempted suicide is any longer
a crime in the United States, 32 states, including New York,
continue to make assisted suicide an offense. The New
York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death
Is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical
Context, 55 (1994) (“When Death Is Sought ”). Clearly, no
“right” to assisted suicide ever has been recognized in any
state in the United States. See generally Mark E. Chopko &
Michael F. Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still a Wonderful Life?,
70 Notre Dame L.Rev. 519, 561 (1995); Yale Kamisar, Are
Laws against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, 23 Hastings
Center Rep., May–June 1993, at 32.
In rejecting the due process-fundamental rights argument
of the plaintiffs, we are mindful of the admonition of the
Supreme Court:
Nor are we inclined to take a
more expansive view of our authority
to discover new fundamental rights
imbedded in the Due Process Clause.
The Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional
law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.
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Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194, 106 S.Ct. at 2846. The right to
assisted suicide finds no cognizable basis in the Constitution's
language or design, even in the very limited cases of those
competent persons who, in the final *725 stages of terminal
illness, seek the right to hasten death. We therefore decline
the plaintiffs' invitation to identify a new fundamental right,
in the absence of a clear direction from the Court whose
precedents we are bound to follow. The limited room for
expansion of substantive due process rights and the reasons
therefor have been clearly stated: “As a general matter, the
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of
substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and openended.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,
125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). Our
position in the judicial hierarchy constrains us to be even more
reluctant than the Court to undertake an expansive approach
in this unchartered area.

III. Equal Protection
According to the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal
protection of the laws cannot be denied by any State to any
person within its jurisdiction. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
This constitutional guarantee simply requires the states to
treat in a similar manner all individuals who are similarly
situated. See 3 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional
Law, supra, § 18.2, at 7. But disparate treatment is not
necessarily a denial of the equal protection guaranteed by
the Constitution. The Supreme Court has described the wide
discretion afforded to the states in establishing acceptable
classifications:
The Equal Protection Clause directs that “all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” But so
too, “[t]he Constitution does not require things which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though
they were the same.” The initial discretion to determine
what is “different” and what is “the same” resides in
the legislatures of the States. A legislature must have
substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly
approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that
accommodate competing concerns both public and private,
and that account for limitations on the practical ability
of the State to remedy every ill. In applying the Equal
Protection Clause to most forms of state action, we thus

seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears
some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72
L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (internal citations omitted and alteration
in original).
[7] The general rule, then, is that state legislation carries
a presumption of validity if the statutory classification is
“rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440,
105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). In Cleburne,
the equal protection issue revolved around a zoning ordinance
that required a special use permit for homes for the mentally
retarded but not for other multiple-dwelling and care-giving
facilities. The Supreme Court resolved the issue as follows:
Because in our view the record does
not reveal any rational basis for
believing that the Featherston home
[for the mentally retarded] would
pose any special threat to the city's
legitimate interests, we affirm the
judgment below insofar as it holds the
ordinance invalid as applied in this
case.
Id. at 448, 105 S.Ct. at 3258. In arriving at this conclusion, the
Court rejected the city's claims that the disparate classification
was justified by the negative attitudes of property owners in
the neighborhood of the proposed facility, the location of the
facility across the street from a junior high school and on
a 500–year flood plain, concerns about legal responsibility
for actions that might be taken by the mentally retarded, or
concerns about the size of the facility and the number of
occupants. Id. at 448–50, 105 S.Ct. at 3258–60. The Court
carefully examined each of these claims before finding that
there was no acceptable reason for the disparate classification
in any of them.
Also found invalid under the Equal Protection Clause for
failure to survive rational basis scrutiny was a New Mexico
statute providing a partial exemption from the state's property
tax for certain honorably discharged veterans. Hooper v.
Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 105 S.Ct. 2862,
86 L.Ed.2d 487 (1985). The exemption was limited to
veterans who had served on *726 active duty during the
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Vietnam War for at least 90 continuous days and were
New Mexico residents before May 8, 1976. In finding the
residence requirement invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court analyzed the New Mexico statute in
light of the following principles: “When a state distributes
benefits unequally, the distinctions it makes are subject to
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Generally, a law will survive that scrutiny if
the distinction rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose.”
Id. at 618, 105 S.Ct. at 2866 (footnote omitted). The Court
determined that the distinction made between veterans who
arrived in the state prior to May 8, 1976 and those who arrived
thereafter bore no rational relationship to the state's declared
objectives of encouraging veterans to settle in the state and of
rewarding citizens who resided in the state prior to the cutoff date for their military service. Id. at 619–20, 105 S.Ct. at
2866–67.
As to the first objective, the Court wrote:
The distinction New Mexico makes
between veterans who established
residence before May 8, 1976,
and those veterans who arrived
in the State thereafter bears no
rational relationship to one of
the State's objectives—encouraging
Vietnam veterans to move to New
Mexico. The legislature set this
eligibility date long after the triggering
event occurred. The legislature cannot
plausibly encourage veterans to move
to the State by passing such retroactive
legislation.
Id. at 619, 105 S.Ct. at 2866–67 (internal citation omitted). As
to the second declared objective, the Court noted that a state
court may legitimately compensate resident veterans for past
services by providing various advantages, but that “the New
Mexico statute's distinction between resident veterans is not
rationally related to the State's asserted legislative goal.” Id.
at 621–22, 105 S.Ct. at 2868. The Court held:
The State may not favor established
residents over new residents based
on the view that the State may take
care of “its own,” if such is defined

by prior residence. Newcomers, by
establishing bona fide residence in
the State, become the State's “own”
and may not be discriminated against
solely on the basis of their arrival in the
State after May 8, 1976.
Id. at 623, 105 S.Ct. at 2868; see also Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982) (holding
that Alaska statute using length of residence as basis for
distribution of oil reserve dividends violated Equal Protection
Clause.)
[8] While rational basis scrutiny governs judicial review
of the constitutionality of legislation in the areas of social
welfare and economics, see Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340,
345, 106 S.Ct. 1881, 1885, 90 L.Ed.2d 316 (1986), strict
scrutiny is the standard of review where a classification
“impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class,” Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976)
(footnotes omitted). Suspect classes are those identified by
race, alienage or national origin, Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440,
105 S.Ct. at 3254–55, and fundamental rights are those
explicitly or implicitly derived from the Constitution itself,
see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 33–34, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1296–97, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973).
For the reasons described in Part II, supra, the New York
statutes prohibiting assisted suicide during the terminal stages
of illness do not impinge on any fundamental rights nor
can it be said that they involve suspect classifications. Laws
subject to strict scrutiny will survive such review only if
they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254–55.
[9] An intermediate level of scrutiny has been applied in
analyzing certain equal protection guarantee violations. To
pass this scrutiny, the classification must be substantially
related to an important governmental objective. Clark v.
Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 1914, 100 L.Ed.2d
465 (1988). This sort of examination has been applied to
classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. Id.; see also
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459, 108 S.Ct.
2481, 2488, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988); *727 Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723–24, 102 S.Ct. 3331,
3335–36, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982). A heightened level of
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equal protection scrutiny also was applied in Plyler, where the
Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute withholding from
local school districts funding for the education of children not
legally admitted into the United States. 457 U.S. at 202, 102
S.Ct. at 2387.
[10] Applying the foregoing principles to the New York
statutes criminalizing assisted suicide, it seems clear that:
1) the statutes in question fall within the category of social
welfare legislation and therefore are subject to rational basis
scrutiny upon judicial review; 2) New York law does not treat
equally all competent persons who are in the final stages of
fatal illness and wish to hasten their deaths; 3) the distinctions
made by New York law with regard to such persons do not
further any legitimate state purpose; and 4) accordingly, to the
extent that the statutes in question prohibit persons in the final
stages of terminal illness from having assistance in ending
their lives by the use of self-administered, prescribed drugs,
the statutes lack any rational basis and are violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.
The right to refuse medical treatment long has been
recognized in New York. In 1914 Judge Cardozo wrote that,
under New York law, “[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body.” Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). In 1981, the
New York Court of Appeals held that this right extended
to the withdrawal of life-support systems. In re Eichner
(decided with In re Storar ), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858, 102 S.Ct.
309, 70 L.Ed.2d 153 (1981). The Eichner case involved a
terminally-ill, 83–year–old patient whose guardian ultimately
was authorized to withdraw the patient's respirator. The Court
of Appeals determined that the guardian had proved by clear
and convincing evidence that the patient, prior to becoming
incompetent due to illness, had consistently expressed his
view that life should not be prolonged if there was no hope
of recovery. Id. at 379–80, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d
64. In Storar, the companion case to Eichner, the Court of
Appeals determined that a profoundly retarded, terminally-ill
patient was incapable of making a decision to terminate blood
transfusions. There, the patient was incapable of making a
reasoned decision, having never been competent at any time
in his life. Id. at 380, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64. In
both these cases, the New York Court of Appeals recognized

the right of a competent, terminally-ill patient to hasten his
death upon proper proof of his desire to do so.
The Court of Appeals revisited the issue in Rivers v. Katz,
67 N.Y.2d 485, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 495 N.E.2d 337 (1986)
(establishing the right of mentally incompetent persons to
refuse certain drugs). In that case, the Court recognized
the right to bring on death by refusing medical treatment
not only as a “fundamental common-law right” but also as
“coextensive with [a] patient's liberty interest protected by the
due process clause of our State Constitution.” Id. at 493, 504
N.Y.S.2d 74, 495 N.E.2d 337. The following language was
included in the opinion:
In our system of a free government,
where notions of individual autonomy
and free choice are cherished, it is the
individual who must have the final say
in respect to decisions regarding his
medical treatment in order to insure
that the greatest possible protection is
accorded his autonomy and freedom
from unwanted interference with the
furtherance of his own desires.
Id.
After these cases were decided, the New York legislature
placed its imprimatur upon the right of competent citizens
to hasten death by refusing medical treatment and by
directing physicians to remove life-support systems already
in place. In 1987, the legislature enacted Article 29–B of
the New York Public Health Law, entitled “Orders Not to
Resuscitate.” N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 2960–79 (McKinney
1993). The Article provides that an “adult with capacity” may
direct the issuance of an order not to resuscitate. § 2964.
“Order not to resuscitate” is defined as “an order not to
attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the event a patient
suffers cardiac or respiratory arrest.” *728 § 2961(17).
“Cardiopulmonary resuscitation” is defined as “measures ...
to restore cardiac function or to support ventilation in the
event of a cardiac or respiratory arrest.” § 2961(4). An
elaborate statutory scheme is in place, and it provides,
among other things, for surrogate decision-making, § 2965,
revocation of consent, § 2969, physician review, § 2970,
dispute mediation, § 2972, and judicial review, § 2973.
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In 1990, the New York legislature enacted Article 29–C of
the Public Health Law, entitled “Health Care Agents and
Proxies.” N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 2980–94 (McKinney
1993). This statute allows for a person to sign a health care
proxy, § 2981, for the purpose of appointing an agent with
“authority to make any and all health care decisions on the
principal's behalf that the principal could make.” § 2982(1).
These decisions include those relating to the administration
of artificial nutrition and hydration, provided the wishes
of the principal are known to the agent. § 2982(2). The
agent's decision is made “[a]fter consultation with a licensed
physician, registered nurse, licensed clinical psychologist or
certified social worker.” Id. Accordingly, a patient has the
right to hasten death by empowering an agent to require
a physician to withdraw life-support systems. The proxy
statute also presents a detailed scheme, with provisions for
a determination that the principal lacks capacity to make
health care decisions, for such a determination to be made
only by the attending physician in consultation with another
physician “[f]or a decision to withdraw or withhold lifesustaining treatment,” § 2983, for provider's obligations, §
2984, for revocation, § 2985, and for special proceedings, §
2992, among other matters.
The concept that a competent person may order the removal
of life-support systems found Supreme Court approval in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
110 S.Ct. 2841, 111 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990). There the Court
upheld a determination of the Missouri Supreme Court that
required proof by clear and convincing evidence of a patient's
desire for the withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment. The
patient in that case, Nancy Cruzan, was in a persistent
vegetative state as the result of injuries sustained in an
automobile accident. Her parents sought court approval in
the State of Missouri to terminate the artificial nutrition and
hydration with which she was supplied at the state hospital
where she was confined. The hospital employees refused
to withdraw the life-support systems, without which Cruzan
would suffer certain death. The trial court authorized the
withdrawal after finding that Cruzan had expressed some
years before to a housemate friend some thoughts that
suggested she would not wish to live on a life-support system.
The trial court also found that one in Cruzan's condition had
a fundamental right to refuse death-prolonging procedures.

that would support a right to refuse treatment. Moreover, that
court doubted that such a right existed under the United States
Constitution. It did identify a state policy in the Missouri
Living Will Statute favoring the preservation of life and
concluded that, in the absence of compliance with the statute's
formalities or clear and convincing evidence of the patient's
choice, no person could order the withdrawal of medical lifesupport services.
In affirming the Missouri Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court stated: “The principle that a competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions.” Id. at 278, 110 S.Ct. at 2851. The Court noted
that the inquiry is not ended by the identification of a liberty
interest, because there also must be a balancing of the state
interests and the individual's liberty interests before there
can be a determination that constitutional rights have been
violated. Id. at 279, 110 S.Ct. at 2851–52. The Court all
but made that determination in the course of the following
analysis:
Petitioners insist that under the
general holdings of our cases,
the forced administration of lifesustaining medical treatment, and even
of artificially-delivered food and water
essential to life, would implicate a
competent person's liberty interest.
*729 Although we think the logic
of the cases discussed above would
embrace such a liberty interest, the
dramatic consequences involved in
refusal of such treatment would
inform the inquiry as to whether
the deprivation of that interest is
constitutionally permissible. But for
purposes of this case, we assume
that the United States Constitution
would grant a competent person
a constitutionally protected right
to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition.
Id.

The Missouri Supreme Court, in reversing the trial court,
refused to find a broad right of privacy in the state constitution
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The Court went on to find that Missouri allowed a surrogate
to “act for the patient in electing to have hydration and
nutrition withdrawn in such a way as to cause death,”
subject to “a procedural safeguard to assure that the
action of the surrogate conforms as best it may to the
wishes expressed by the patient while competent.” Id. at
280, 110 S.Ct. at 2852. The Court then held that the
procedural safeguard or requirement imposed by Missouri—
the heightened evidentiary requirement that the incompetent's
wishes be proved by clear and convincing evidence—was not
forbidden by the United States Constitution. Id. at 280–82,
110 S.Ct. at 2852–53.

Moreover, the writing of a prescription to hasten death, after
consultation with a patient, involves a far less active role for
the physician than is required in bringing about death through
asphyxiation, starvation and/or dehydration. Withdrawal of
life support requires physicians or those acting at their
direction physically to remove equipment and, often, to
administer palliative drugs which may themselves contribute
to death. The ending of life by these means is nothing more
nor less than assisted suicide. It simply cannot be said that
those mentally competent, terminally-ill persons who seek to
hasten death but whose treatment does not include life support
are treated equally.

In view of the foregoing, it seems clear that New York does
not treat similarly circumstanced persons alike: those in the
final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems
are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal
of such systems; but those who are similarly situated, except
for the previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, are
not allowed to hasten death by self-administering prescribed
drugs. The district judge has identified “a difference between
allowing nature to take its course, even in the most
severe situations, and intentionally using an artificial deathproducing device.” Quill, 870 F.Supp. at 84. But Justice
Scalia, for one, has remarked upon “the irrelevance of the
action-inaction distinction,” noting that “the cause of death
in both cases is the suicide's conscious decision to ‘pu[t]
an end to his own existence.’ ” Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296–
297, 110 S.Ct. at 2861 (citations omitted and alteration in
original) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Note, Physician–
Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105
Harv. L.Rev. 2021, 2028–31 (1992) (arguing that there is no
distinction between assisted suicide and the withholding or
withdrawal of treatment).

A finding of unequal treatment does not, of course, end
the inquiry, unless it is determined that the inequality is
not rationally related to some legitimate state interest. The
burden is upon the plaintiffs to demonstrate irrationality.
See Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 463, 108 S.Ct. at 2490. At oral
argument and in its brief, the state's contention has been that
its principal interest is in preserving the life of all its citizens
at all times and under all conditions. But what interest can
the state possibly have in requiring the prolongation of a life
that is all but ended? Surely, the state's interest lessens as the
potential for life diminishes. See In re Quinlan, *730 70
N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922, 97 S.Ct.
319, 50 L.Ed.2d 289 (1976). And what business is it of the
state to require the continuation of agony when the result is
imminent and inevitable? What concern prompts the state to
interfere with a mentally competent patient's “right to define
[his] own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life,” Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2807, 120 L.Ed.2d
674 (1992), when the patient seeks to have drugs prescribed
to end life during the final stages of a terminal illness? The
greatly reduced interest of the state in preserving life compels
the answer to these questions: “None.”

Indeed, there is nothing “natural” about causing death by
means other than the original illness or its complications.
The withdrawal of nutrition brings on death by starvation,
the withdrawal of hydration brings on death by dehydration,
and the withdrawal of ventilation brings about respiratory
failure. By ordering the discontinuance of these artificial lifesustaining processes or refusing to accept them in the first
place, a patient hastens his death by means that are not natural
in any sense. It certainly cannot be said that the death that
immediately ensues is the natural result of the progression of
the disease or condition from which the patient suffers.

A panel of the Ninth Circuit attempted to identify some
state interests in reversing a district court decision holding
unconstitutional a statute of the state of Washington
criminalizing the promotion of a suicide attempt. Compassion
in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.1995). 2 The
plaintiffs in the Washington case contended for physicianassisted suicide for the terminally-ill, but the panel majority
found that the statute prohibiting suicide promotion furthered
the following: the interest in denying to physicians “the
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role of killers of their patients”; the interest in avoiding
psychological pressure upon the elderly and infirm to consent
to death; the interest of preventing the exploitation of the poor
and minorities; the interest in protecting handicapped persons
against societal indifference; the interest in preventing the sort
of abuse that “has occurred in the Netherlands where ... legal
guidelines have tacitly allowed assisted suicide or euthanasia
in response to a repeated request from a suffering, competent
patient.” Id. at 592–93. The panel majority also raised a
question relative to the lack of clear definition of the term
“terminally ill.” Id. at 593.

how the relief the *731 plaintiffs seek would lead to the
abuses found in the Netherlands. Moreover, note should be
taken of the fact that the Royal Dutch Medical Association
recently adopted new guidelines for those physicians who
choose to accede to the wishes of patients to hasten death.
Under the new guidelines, patients must self-administer drugs
whenever possible, and physicians must obtain a second
opinion from another physician who has no relationship with
the requesting physician or his patient. Marlise Simons, Dutch
Doctors to Tighten Rules on Mercy Killings, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 11, 1995, at A3.

2

3

On rehearing in banc, the Ninth Circuit vacated the
decision of the panel and affirmed the decision of the
district court. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79
F.3d 790 (9th Cir.1996) (in banc).

The New York statutes prohibiting assisted suicide, which
are similar to the Washington statute, do not serve any of the
state interests noted, in view of the statutory and common
law schemes allowing suicide through the withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment. Physicians do not fulfill the role
of “killer” by prescribing drugs to hasten death any more
than they do by disconnecting life-support systems. Likewise,
“psychological pressure” can be applied just as much upon the
elderly and infirm to consent to withdrawal of life-sustaining
equipment as to take drugs to hasten death. There is no clear
indication that there has been any problem in regard to the
former, and there should be none as to the latter. In any event,
the state of New York may establish rules and procedures to
assure that all choices are free of such pressures. With respect
to the protection of minorities, the poor and the non-mentally
handicapped, it suffices to say that these classes of persons
are entitled to treatment equal to that afforded to all those who
now may hasten death by means of life-support withdrawal.
In point of fact, these persons themselves are entitled to hasten
death by requesting such withdrawal and should be free to
do so by requesting appropriate medication to terminate life
during the final stages of terminal illness.

Finally, it seems clear that most physicians would agree on
the definition of “terminally ill,” at least for the purpose of
the relief that plaintiffs seek. The plaintiffs seek to hasten
death only where a patient is in the “final stages” of “terminal
illness,” and it seems even more certain that physicians
would agree on when this condition occurs. Physicians
are accustomed to advising patients and their families in
this regard and frequently do so when decisions are to be
made regarding the furnishing or withdrawal of life-support
systems. Again, New York may define that stage of illness
with greater particularity, require the opinion of more than
one physician or impose any other obligation upon patients
and physicians who collaborate in hastening death. 4
4

As to the interest in avoiding abuse similar to that occurring
in the Netherlands, it seems clear that some physicians there
practice nonvoluntary euthanasia, although it is not legal to
do so. When Death Is Sought, supra, at 133–34. The plaintiffs
here do not argue for euthanasia 3 at all but for assisted
suicide for terminally-ill, mentally competent patients, who
would self-administer the lethal drugs. It is difficult to see

There are those who use the terms “assisted suicide”
and “euthanasia” interchangeably. See Patricia A. Unz,
Note, Euthanasia: A Constitutionally Protected Peaceful
Death, 37 N.Y.L. Sch. L.Rev. 439, 439 n. 8 (1992).
While euthanasia is derived from the Greek words
meaning “good death,” id. at 441, it seems clear that most
states, including New York, make a distinction between
the two acts. See When Death Is Sought, supra, at 63. In
euthanasia, one causes the death of another by direct and
intentional acts. Id. Accordingly, euthanasia falls within
the definition of murder in New York. See N.Y. Penal
Law § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1987).

For example, the state might take steps to assure
the competence of prescribing physicians by imposing
education and training qualifications, including pain
management; it may require the establishment of local
ethics committees as resources for physicians faced with
questions relating to requests for lethal medications; it
could specify the information to be furnished to the
patient to ascertain that the patient's choice is a fully
voluntary one; it might require consultations with other
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physicians for further diagnosis and prognosis in regard
to the patient's illness, for psychiatric evaluation, and for
evaluation of pain control possibilities; it may provide a
time delay between a request for lethal medication and
the prescription in order to allow a time for reflection;
and it may suggest some sort of notification to the
patient's family.
Recently, a group of physicians known as “Physicians
for Mercy” proposed ten guidelines for doctor-assisted
suicide. Doctors Offer Some Support to Kevorkian:
Urge 10 Guidelines in Assisting Suicide, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 5, 1995, at A21. These guidelines call for a
physician who assists in suicide, called an “obitiatrist,”
to refer his patients to a psychiatrist, a specialist in the
patient's specific illness, and, if necessary, a specialist
in pain management, before acting at the behest
of a mentally competent person with an incurable
affliction. Id. “Physicians for Mercy” has decided
to call the practice of physician assisted suicide
“patholysis,” a term coined by Dr. Jack Kevorkian,
who has assisted in more than two dozen suicides.
Id. However, Dr. Kevorkian's assistance has not
been rendered exclusively to those beset by terminal
illnesses. Bruce Fein, The Right to Determine One's
Exit from Life, Wash. Times, Jan. 23, 1996, at A14.

The New York statutes criminalizing assisted suicide violate
the Equal Protection Clause because, to the extent that they
prohibit a physician from prescribing medications to be selfadministered by a mentally competent, terminally-ill person
in the final stages of his terminal illness, they are not
rationally related to any legitimate state interest.

Fourteenth Amendment since they are not “rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.” Ante at 725 (citing City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105
S.Ct. 3249, 3254–55, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)). At the same
time, the Court declines to hold that these statutes violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because
“[t]he right to assisted suicide finds no cognizable basis in the
Constitution's language or design.” Ante at 724.
Recently the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that
analogous laws violated the *732 fundamental Due Process
rights of terminally ill patients. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.1996) (en banc ). The
Ninth Circuit recognized that Equal Protection arguments for
invalidity were “not insubstantial,” but did not discuss them
in view of its Due Process holding. Id. at 838 n. 139.
I agree with the Court that these statutes cannot stand. But
I do not believe that the history of the statutes, and of New
York's approach toward assisted suicide, requires us to make
a final judgment under either Due Process or Equal Protection
as to the validity of statutes prohibiting assisted suicide. What
is not ready for decision ought not to be decided. I would
therefore leave open the question of whether, if the state of
New York were to enact new laws prohibiting assisted suicide
(laws that either are less absolute in their application or are
identical to those before us), such laws would stand or fall.
Accordingly, I join the Court's result, but write separately to
explain my unwillingness to reach the ultimate Due Process
and Equal Protection questions.

CONCLUSION
We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand
for entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in accordance
with the foregoing. No costs are awarded to either side. See
Fed.R.App.P. 39(a).

CALABRESI, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result.
The Court today strikes down the New York statutes
prohibiting assisted suicide insofar as they apply to
“terminally ill, mentally competent patients, who would selfadminister drugs.” It does so because it finds these statutes
to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

I. A Bit of History
There once was a time when the law and its judges
were not called upon to make choices for human beings
lying in the twilight between life and death. In the past,
many of these decisions were left to individual doctors
and their patients. Sometimes, easing of pain melded,
not quite imperceptibly, into more. While doctors did not
advertise their availability, there often was an understanding
(perhaps unspoken), as patients entered into what usually
were long-term relationships with physicians, that when
the time came doctors would do what was expected of
them. Laws prohibiting assisted suicide were on the books.
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But whether they were ever meant to apply to a treating
physician, or whether such doctors were even slightly
concerned about them, is unclear and lost in the shadows
of time. 1 And despite a web of statutes, and doctors
who, understandably, have become increasingly averse to
taking risks and responsibilities, that tradition undoubtedly
continues today. As the majority demonstrates, however, this
fact is not a prescription for judicial silence. Ante at 722–
23. We must, therefore, address petitioners' claim that New
York's laws are invalid.
1

See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE
AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT:
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE
MEDICAL CONTEXT 57 (1994) ( “No person has
been convicted in New York State of manslaughter
for intentionally aiding or causing a suicide.... The
reluctance to bring such cases no doubt rests in part on
the degree of public sympathy [such cases] often arouse,
and the resulting difficulty of securing an indictment
and conviction.”); Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 811
(footnotes omitted) (“[T]he mere presence of statutes
criminalizing assisting in a suicide does not necessarily
indicate societal disapproval. That is especially true
when such laws are seldom, if ever, enforced. There is
no reported American case of criminal punishment being
meted out to a doctor for helping a patient hasten his
own death.... Running beneath the official history of legal
condemnation of physician-assisted suicide is a strong
undercurrent of a time-honored but hidden practice of
physicians helping terminally ill patients to hasten their
deaths.”).

The statutes at issue were born in another age. New York
enacted its first prohibition of assisted suicide in 1828.
The statute punished any individual who assisted another in
committing “self-murder” for first-degree manslaughter. Act
of Dec. 10, 1828, ch. 20, 4 1828 N.Y. Laws 19 (codified
at N.Y.Rev.Stat. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 7 (1829)). This
prohibition was tied to the crime of suicide, described by one
contemporary New York Court as a “criminal act of selfdestruction.” Breasted v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 4 Hill
73, 75 (Sup.Ct.1843), aff'd, 8 N.Y. 299 (1853).
English authorities had long declared suicide to be murder.
See 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 54 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1797) (1644);
1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 411–

18 (London, E. & R. Nutt 1736) (1680); 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND *189 (1769); 3 JAMES FITZJAMES
STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 104 (1869); William E. Mikell, Is Suicide
Murder?, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 391 (1903) (“[W]hatever
may have been the law before Bracton's time ... suicide
*733 is murder in English law.”). And the leading American
case echoed these English authorities. See Commonwealth
v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816). In that case, Chief Justice
Parker instructed the jury: “Self-destruction is doubtless a
crime of awful turpitude; it is considered in the eye of the law
of equal heinousness with the murder of one by another. In
this offence, it is true the actual murderer escapes punishment;
for the very commission of the crime, which the the [sic]
law would otherwise punish with its utmost rigor, puts the
offender beyond the reach of its infliction. And in this he
is distinguished from other murderers. But his punishment
is as severe as the nature of the case will admit; his body
is buried in infamy, and in England his property is forfeited
to the King.” Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 428
(1877) (reprinting Parker's jury instructions in Bowen ). Mink
itself, written by Chief Justice Gray, found that “any attempt
to commit” suicide is “unlawful and criminal.” Id. at 429.
Four years after Mink, however, the New York Legislature
revised the Penal Code. The new code provided that an
intentional attempt to commit suicide was a felony with a
maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment. Act of July 26,
1881, ch. 676, §§ 174, 178, 3 1881 N.Y. Laws 42–43. But
while the Code declared suicide itself to be “a grave public
wrong,” it imposed no forfeiture because of “the impossibility
of reaching the successful perpetrator.” Id. § 173. The 1881
statute, echoing the earlier 1828 provision, punished assisting
a successful suicide as manslaughter in the first degree. Id. §
175. The Code also punished assistance in attempted suicide
as an unspecified felony. Id. § 176.
Whatever may have been the case in other jurisdictions, 2 the
1828 and 1881 statutes prohibited all attempts to assist in a
suicide on the theory that such behavior created accessory
liability. Thus, because attempted suicide was a crime,
assisting in the commission of suicide was also a crime. And
the titles of the sections of the 1881 statute manifest these
derivative origins; section 175 prohibited “Aiding suicide”
and section 176 prohibited “Abetting an attempt at suicide.”
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that he reasonably believes it necessary to thwart such
result.” Act of July 20, 1965, ch. 1030, 1965 N.Y. Laws
2355 (codified at N.Y. Penal Law § 35.10(4)). See Von
Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 68, 450 N.Y.S.2d
623, 626 (4th Dep't 1982) (upholding order authorizing
forced feeding of John Lennon's murderer, Mark David
Chapman, to prevent Chapman from starving himself to
death because “[t]he preservation of life has a high social
value in our culture”).

Id. (emphasis added). 3 Whether these laws applied to a
doctor who eased or hastened the death of a terminally ill
patient is, of course, quite another matter, and one on which
the evidence is scant. 4
2

See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 846–47 (Beezer, J.,
dissenting).

3

The 1937 New York Report of the Law Revision
Commission explicitly found that “[t]he history of the
[abetting and advising suicide] provision is traceable into
the ancient common law when a suicide or felo de se was
guilty of a crime punishable by forfeiture of his goods
and chattels. One who encouraged or aided him was
guilty as an accessory to the crime of ‘self-murder’....”
STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW
REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1937, at 830 (1937).

4

See supra note 1.

The 1881 scheme was altered in 1919 when the prohibition
against attempted suicide (originally found in sections 174
and 178) was removed. Act of May 5, 1919, ch. 414, §
1, 2 1919 N.Y. Laws 1193. The Legislature, nevertheless,
left in place the declaration of suicide as a “grave public
wrong.” See Hundert v. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Accident
Ass'n of Am., 244 A.D. 459, 460, 279 N.Y.S. 555, 556 (1st
Dep't 1935) (per curiam) (“[S]uicide, although recognized as
a grave public wrong, is not a crime.”). And the prohibition
of assisting suicide also remained on the books. But we have
found no case in which a physician aiding a person who
wished to commit suicide was, in fact, penalized in New York
after 1919.
In 1965, the Legislature took the next step and deleted the
declaration that suicide was a “grave public wrong.” 5 It,
however, left in place redrafted versions of sections 175 and
*734 176 of the 1881 Code, stating: “A person is guilty of
manslaughter in the second degree when ... [h]e intentionally
causes or aids another person to commit suicide,” § 125.15(3),
and, “[a] person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt
when he intentionally causes or aids another person to attempt
suicide,” § 120.30. 6
5

The 1965 Act did provide that “[a] person acting under a
reasonable belief that another person is about to commit
suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon himself
may use physical force upon such person to the extent

6

Why the legislature left the prohibition of assisted suicide
in the law, and whether it thought about the issue
at all is hard to say. The 1937 Law Revision Report
had, in a sense, presaged the event when it said that
since New York had removed “all stigma [of suicide]
as a crime” and that “[s]ince liability as an accessory
could no longer hinge upon the crime of a principal,
it was necessary to define it as a substantive offense.”
REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION,
supra note 3, at 831. The Commission seemed to have
been concerned primarily with those who talked others
into killing themselves. It noted the important difference
between aiding someone who had a mind-set to commit
suicide and the “more dangerous” person “working upon
the mind of a susceptible person to induce suicide,” id.
at 832.

The years since 1965 have brought further erosion in the bases
for prohibiting assisted suicide with respect to terminally ill
persons. Thus, in 1981, the New York Court of Appeals
declared that “a doctor cannot be held to have violated
his legal or professional responsibilities when he honors
the right of a competent adult patient to decline medical
treatment.” In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 377, 420 N.E.2d
64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858,
102 S.Ct. 309, 70 L.Ed.2d 153 (1981). The court applied
this principle both to the withdrawal of life-support and
to the refusal of blood transfusions. Id. at 379–80, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64. Furthermore, in 1986, the court
stated: “In our system of a free government, where notions
of individual autonomy and free choice are cherished, it is
the individual who must have the final say in respect to
decisions regarding his medical treatment....” Rivers v. Katz,
67 N.Y.2d 485, 493, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74,
78 (1986). Lower courts, understandably, followed suit. See
Delio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 129 A.D.2d 1, 516
N.Y.S.2d 677 (2d Dep't 1987) (“[T]he common-law right of
self determination with respect to one's body also forms the
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foundation for a competent adult patient's right to refuse lifesustaining treatment even if the effect is to hasten death....”).
The New York Legislature itself acted accordingly. In the
1987 Orders Not to Resuscitate Act, it provided that an “adult
with capacity” may create an “order not to resuscitate” in
the event the patient “suffers cardiac or respiratory arrest.”
Act of Aug. 7, 1987, ch. 818, § 1, 1987 N.Y. Laws 3140
(codified as amended at N.Y. Pub. Health Law, §§ 2960–2979
(McKinney 1993 & Supp.1996)). In the 1990 Health Care
Agents and Proxies Act, it went further and permitted a
competent person to designate an agent who has “authority
to make any and all health care decisions on the principal's
behalf that the principal could make.” Act of July 22, 1990,
ch. 752, § 2, 1990 N.Y. Laws 1538 (codified as amended
at N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2982(1) (McKinney 1993)). The
statute explicitly stated that choices regarding the withdrawal
of artificial nutrition and hydration are within the purview
of a health care agent when the wishes of the principal are
reasonably known to the agent. N.Y. Pub. Health Law §
2982(2). 7
7

The 1990 Act provided the following caution: “This
article is not intended to permit or promote suicide,
assisted suicide, or euthanasia; accordingly, nothing
herein shall be construed to permit an agent to consent
to any act or omission to which the principal could not
consent under law.” N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2989(3).
The full significance of this section is not clear. It
understandably limited the agent to doing those acts to
which the principal, on whose behalf the agent is acting,
could consent. It also seemed to leave in place the status
quo both as to those acts, like suicide, which were no
longer crimes and those, like assisted suicide, which
nominally were. But the section did not go further, as
New York claims in a letter brief where it says, citing §
2989(3), that “New York's legislature expressly rejected
permitting physician assisted suicide.” Section 2989(3)
did not speak to this any more than it spoke to the legality
of suicide.

Later, in 1994, the New York Task Force on Life and the
Law, a group organized in 1985 at the request of Governor
Cuomo and composed of doctors, bioethicists, and religious
leaders, among others, prepared a report on the question.
The report, in effect, *735 said leave things as they are:
permit suicide and attempted suicide, recognize the right
of competent terminally ill patients—either on their own

or through agents—to order the ceasing of nutrition and
hydration and the withdrawal of life support systems, but
do not alter the law to permit what petitioners seek today.
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE
LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT: ASSISTED SUICIDE
AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 142–
46 (1994). The Legislature received the report and, not
surprisingly, took no action, then or since.
From this historical survey, I conclude that 1) what petitioners
seek is nominally still forbidden by New York statutes; 2)
the bases of these statutes have been deeply eroded over the
last hundred and fifty years; and 3) few of their foundations
remain in place today.
Specifically:
● The original reason for the statutes—criminalizing conduct
that aided or abetted other crimes—is long since gone.
● The distinction that has evolved over the years between
conduct currently permitted (suicide, and aiding someone
who wishes to die to do so by removing hydration, feeding,
and life support systems) and conduct still prohibited (giving
a competent, terminally ill patient lethal drugs, which he or
she can self-administer) is tenuous at best. 8
8

See ante at 728–31 (the majority opinion's powerful
discussion of the weakness of the distinction).

● The Legislature—for many, many years—has not taken
any recognizably affirmative step reaffirming the prohibition
of what petitioners seek.
● The enforcement of the laws themselves has fallen into
virtual desuetude—not so much as to render the case before
us nonjusticiable, but enough to cast doubt on whether, in
a case like that which the petitioners present, a prosecutor
would prosecute or a jury would convict. And this fact by
itself inevitably raises doubts about the current support for
these laws. 9
9

We note in passing that a jury in Michigan recently
acquitted Dr. Jack Kevorkian after he argued (despite
his earlier, quite explicit, publicity and statements) that
all he was doing was ending pain. See Todd Nissen,
Kevorkian Found Not Guilty in Assisted Suicide Trial,
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Reuters, Mar. 8, 1996. We note also that Iowa has just
enacted a law forbidding assisted suicide and that this law
does not prohibit “the responsible actions of a licensed
health professional to administer pain medication to a
patient with a terminal illness.” See Gov. Branstad Signs
Bill Outlawing Assisted Suicide, BNA Health Care Daily,
Mar. 5, 1996.

II. Constitutional Doubts
In the case of ordinary legislation none of this would matter
much. We regularly uphold laws whose original reason
has vanished, whose fit with the rest of the legal system
is dubious, whose enforcement is virtually nil, and whose
continued presence on the books seems as much due to the
strong inertial force that the framers of our constitutions
gave to the status quo as to any current majoritarian support.
In a different context, I have argued that courts have used
subterfuges and aggressive interpretations to rid the system
of such laws. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163–66, 172–77 (1982).
But I have also criticized such judicial action, at least in
the absence of express legislative sanction. See id.; Taber v.
Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1039 (2d Cir.1995).
When legislation comes close to violating fundamental
substantive constitutional rights or to running counter to the
requirements of Equal Protection, however, there is, as I hope
to demonstrate, a long tradition of constitutional holdings that
inertia will not do. In such instances, courts have asserted the
right to strike down statutes and, before ruling on the ultimate
validity of that legislation, to demand a present and positive
acknowledgment of the values that the legislators wish to
further through the legislation in issue. And so it is to an
examination of the substantive constitutional dubiety of the
laws before us that I now turn.
There can be no doubt that the statutes at issue come close
—at the very least—to infringing fundamental Due Process
rights and to doing so in ways that are also suspect under the
antidiscrimination principles of the *736 Equal Protection
Clause. While differing in emphasis, the various opinions
of the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 111
L.Ed.2d 224 (1990), and in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), as
well as the en banc opinion of the Ninth Circuit in Companion

in Dying, and the strongly argued majority opinion in this
case, make that abundantly clear.
In Cruzan, the Court examined whether guardians could
order withdrawal of an incompetent patient's life support
when, contrary to the requirements of the State of Missouri,
there was not clear and convincing proof of the patient's
wish to have life support withdrawn. In deciding that the
guardians could not so order, the majority opinion noted that
“[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.” 497 U.S.
at 278, 110 S.Ct. at 2851. It went on to describe the decision to
withdraw life support as “deeply personal” and noted that “[i]t
cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause protects an
interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining
medical treatment.” Id. at 281, 110 S.Ct. at 2853.
Various Justices expanded on this theme. Justice O'Connor,
concurring, wrote, “I agree that a protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred
from our prior decisions, see ante, at 278–79 [110 S.Ct. at
2851–52], and that the refusal of artificially delivered food
and water is encompassed within that liberty interest. See
ante, at 279 [110 S.Ct. at 2851–52].” Id. at 287, 110 S.Ct.
at 2856. She then added, “Requiring a competent adult to
endure such procedures against her will burdens the patient's
liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her
own treatment. Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects anything,
an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical
treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water.”
Id. at 289, 110 S.Ct. at 2857. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissenting, made a similar
point: “Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the
thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent.
A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of
extreme consequence.” Id. at 310–11, 110 S.Ct. at 2868.
In turn, Justice Stevens, also dissenting, powerfully noted:
“Choices about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty,
and the concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the
conditions of our own mortality are undoubtedly ‘so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental....’ ” Id. at 343, 110 S.Ct. at 2885.
Even Justice Scalia, who was the only member of the Court
to find that no liberty interest was implicated, recognized that
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such issues touch the essence of our humanity. He argued that
the Constitution was silent on the question of whether one had
a liberty interest in refusing life support, and that such a right
could not be found in our history and tradition. Id. at 293–96,
110 S.Ct. at 2859–61 (Scalia, J., concurring). He then went on
to say: “Are there, then, no reasonable and humane limits that
ought not to be exceeded in requiring an individual to preserve
his own life? There obviously are, but they are not set forth
in the Due Process Clause. What assures us that those limits
will not be exceeded is the same constitutional guarantee that
is the source of most of our protection—what protects us, for
example, from being assessed a tax of 100% of our income
above the subsistence level, from being forbidden to drive
cars, or from being required to send our children to school
for 10 hours a day, none of which horribles are categorically
prohibited by the Constitution. Our salvation is the Equal
Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to
accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose
on you and me.” Id. at 300, 110 S.Ct. at 2863. Significantly, as
the majority today points out, Justice Scalia also made clear
that he recognized no sensible difference between assisted
suicide (of the sort involved in the case before us) and assisted
removal of life support and feeding tubes. “[T]he cause of
death in both cases is the suicide's conscious decision to ‘pu[t]
an *737 end to his own existence.’ ” Id. at 295–97, 110 S.Ct.
at 2860–61 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Although the Court in Cruzan did not ultimately decide
whether a patient had a constitutionally protected right to die,
the majority opinion clearly recognized that any infringement
of such a liberty interest was at least constitutionally
suspect. 10 It said, “Petitioners insist that under the general
holdings of our cases, the forced administration of lifesustaining medical treatment, and even of artificially
delivered food and water essential to life, would implicate
a competent person's liberty interest. Although we think
the logic of the cases discussed above would embrace such
a liberty interest, the dramatic consequences involved in
refusal of such treatment would inform the inquiry as to
whether the deprivation of that interest is constitutionally
permissible. But for purposes of this case, we assume that the
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration
and nutrition.” Id. at 279, 110 S.Ct. at 2852.

10

Both Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, making it an opinion for the
Court. Their own concurring opinions, however, gave
significantly different glosses to the Court's opinion. See
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287, 110 S.Ct. at 2856 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (“As the Court notes, the liberty interest
in refusing medical treatment flows from decisions
involving the State's invasions into the body. See ante, at
278–279 [110 S.Ct. at 2851–52]”); id. at 293, 110 S.Ct.
at 2859 (Scalia, J. concurring) (“While I agree with the
Court's analysis today, and therefore join in its opinion,
I would have preferred that we announce, clearly and
promptly, that the federal courts have no business in this
field....”).

What is more, the Court in Cruzan did not merely “assume”
that a liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment existed. It found that a prohibition of life-support
termination would deprive a patient of that liberty interest. In
doing so, the Court noted that “determining that a person has
a ‘liberty interest’ under the Due Process Clause does not end
the inquiry,” and that “whether respondent's constitutional
rights have been violated must be determined by balancing
his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.” Id.
at 279, 110 S.Ct. at 2851–52 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). It then “assumed” that when a patient's
liberty interest was balanced against Missouri's interest in life,
the balance would come out in favor of the patient.
Cruzan never actually struck this balance, of course, because
the Court found that Missouri could insist on strong
evidentiary requirements to ensure that Cruzan wanted to
die, since “the Due Process Clause protects an interest in
life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment,” id. at 281, 110 S.Ct. at 2853. But this in no way
undermines Cruzan 's holding that in determining whether a
patient has a constitutional right to die, we are required to
“balance” the consequences of the state's prohibition of lifesupport termination against the state's interest in preserving
life. Id. at 279, 110 S.Ct. at 2851–52.
Cruzan, therefore, teaches us that statutes that interfere with
an individual's decision to terminate life are suspect under
the Due Process Clause. The right to act on that decision
is one that may or may not receive ultimate constitutional
protection, however, depending on the power of the state's
interests and the clarity with which those interests are
expressed. Moreover, as Justice Scalia in his concurrence
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points out, the Equal Protection Clause also requires courts
to examine whether such statutes apply equally to “you and
me”—regardless of whether the prohibited activity interferes
with a fundamental right or disadvantages a suspect class.
Like Cruzan, Casey suggests that New York's assisted
suicide statutes are of doubtful constitutionality. In Casey, the
Court noted that “[o]ur law affords constitutional protection
to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education” and that “the Constitution places limits on a
State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions
about ... bodily integrity.” 505 U.S. at 851, 849, 112 S.Ct. at
2806–07, 2806. In this respect, Casey borrowed from Justice
Harlan's formulation in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543,
81 S.Ct. 1752, 1776–77, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), *738 505 U.S. at 848–49, 112 S.Ct. at 2805–
06, and defined liberty interests to include choices at the
core of human existence. Following Harlan, it stated: “These
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence.... Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State.” Id. at 851, 112
S.Ct. at 2807.
Today's majority and the Ninth Circuit, en banc, in
Compassion in Dying, go further than the Supreme Court
did in Cruzan and Casey. These circuits—the first to rule
on the matter—hold that laws prohibiting physicians from
assisting suicide in some circumstances actually violate the
Constitution. The majority does so because it can see no valid
Equal Protection difference between the so-called “passive”
assistance that New York allows and the “active” assistance
that New York purports to forbid. The Ninth Circuit, instead,
finds a violation of a fundamental Due Process right. 11
11

And some distinguished scholars agree. See, e.g., Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REVV.
737, 794–95 (1989) ( “If the decision to live or die
is said to be so fundamental to a person that the
state may not make it for him, then it is difficult to
see on what plausible ground the right to make this
decision could be granted to those on life support but
denied to all other individuals.”). There are, of course,

distinguished scholars who disagree. See, e.g., Yale
Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide—Even a Very Limited
Form, 72 DETROIT MERCY L. REV . 735, 753–60
(1995).

In light of these opinions, I believe that it cannot be denied
that the laws here involved, whether tested by Due Process
or by Equal Protection, are highly suspect. It is also the case,
however, that neither Cruzan, nor Casey, nor the language
of our Constitution, nor our constitutional tradition clearly
makes these laws invalid. What, then, should be done?

III. The Constitutional Remand
I contend that when a law is neither plainly unconstitutional
(because in derogation of one of the express clauses of our
fundamental charter or, for that matter, of the more general
clauses, as these have been interpreted in our constitutional
history and traditions), nor plainly constitutional, the courts
ought not to decide the ultimate validity of that law without
current and clearly expressed statements, by the people or
by their elected officials, of the state interests involved. It is
my further contention, that, absent such statements, the courts
have frequently struck down such laws, while leaving open
the possibility of reconsideration if appropriate statements
were subsequently made.
Thus, in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129, 78 S.Ct. 1113,
1119–20, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958), in striking down a State
Department directive limiting citizens' passport rights, the
Supreme Court, said: “Where activities or enjoyment, natural
and often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen,
such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all
delegated powers that curtail or dilute them. We hesitate
to find in this broad generalized power an authority to
trench so heavily on the rights of the citizen.... Thus we
do not reach the question of constitutionality. We only
conclude that § 1185 and § 211a do not delegate to
the Secretary the kind of authority exercised here.” And
in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3
L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959), in voiding a loyalty-security program
that did not provide for confrontation of witnesses, the
Court stated: “[Legislative and executive decisions] must be
made explicitly not only to assure that individuals are not
deprived of cherished rights under procedures not actually
authorized, but also because explicit action, especially in
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areas of doubtful constitutionality, requires careful and
purposeful consideration by those responsible for enacting
and implementing our laws.” Id. at 507, 79 S.Ct. at 1419
(citation omitted)

13

Interpretation to avoid constitutional questions and
undue delegation have proven particularly useful to the
Supreme Court as ways of sending back for a second look
federal statutes that came close to infringing fundamental
rights. These devices, however, are either not available
or are problematic when the statute that skates close
to a constitutional line is a state law, since both what
can and cannot be delegated within a state and how
a state statute should be interpreted are paradigmatic
issues of state law. Compare Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 254, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1213–14, 1 L.Ed.2d
1311 (1957) (plurality opinion applying a concept akin
to undue delegation to find that “[t]he lack of any
indications that the legislature wanted the information
the Attorney General attempted to elicit from petitioner
must be treated as the absence of authority. It follows
that the use of the contempt power ... was not in
accordance with ... due process”) with id. at 254–55,
77 S.Ct. at 1214 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
result) (disagreeing with plurality on this issue because
“whether the Attorney General of New Hampshire acted
within the scope of the authority given him by the state
legislature is a matter for the decision of the courts of that
State, as it is for the federal courts to determine whether
an agency to which Congress has delegated power has
acted within the confines of its mandate”). In such
circumstances, a reconsideration can occur at the behest
of a federal court only if that court is willing impose
a constitutional remand directly. See infra (discussion
of Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct.
2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), and Abele v. Markle, 342
F.Supp. 800 (D.Conn.1972)).

14

The other four votes in the majority held that the statute
was an invalid discrimination against women. Califano,
430 U.S. at 217, 97 S.Ct. at 1032 (plurality opinion).

The same view was expressed even by the great constitutional
absolutist, Justice Hugo L. Black. In Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 79 S.Ct. 1081, 3 L.Ed.2d 1115
(1959), in dissent, he argued that the authority *739 of
the House UnAmerican Activities Committee to investigate
communism in education should be limited, “[f]or we are
dealing here with governmental procedures which the Court
itself admits reach to the very fringes of congressional power.
In such cases more is required of legislatures than a vague
delegation to be filled in later by mute acquiescence.” Id. at
139–40, 79 S.Ct. at 1100 (footnote omitted). 12
12

The Court's opinion in Kent and Justice Black's dissent
in Barenblatt relied in part on a pair of delegation
opinions by Chief Justice Hughes dating from the
1930s. These were treated as using a similar approach
because, in the 1930s, the statutes at issue were at the
fringes of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause. See Kent, 357 U.S. at 129, 78 S.Ct. at 1119–
20 (citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
420–30, 55 S.Ct. 241, 248–53, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935));
Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 140 n. 7, 79 S.Ct. at 1100 n.
7 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Panama Refining and
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935)).

While these earlier cases leaned in part on statutory
interpretation or on broad readings of doctrines such as
delegation and vagueness, more recent opinions have applied
constitutional remands directly. 13 In Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199, 97 S.Ct. 1021, 51 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977), for
example, Justice Stevens provided the swing vote in the
Court's five-to-four decision that the Social Security Act's
grant of special benefits to widows was in violation of Equal
Protection. He found that the law discriminated “against a
group of males [and] is merely the accidental byproduct of a
traditional way of thinking about females.” Id. at 233, 97 S.Ct.
at 1040 (Stevens, J., concurring). Significantly, he went on
to say that “[p]erhaps an actual, considered legislative choice
would be sufficient to allow this statute to be upheld, but that
is a question I would reserve until such a choice has been
made.” Id. at 223 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. at 1035 n. 9. 14

The powerful, and telling, concurring opinion by Justice
O'Connor in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct.
2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), which provided the fifth vote
to strike down state death penalty laws applicable to minors
less than sixteen years of age, did the same thing. The fact that
such laws were on the books in many states did not suffice
to meet the strictures of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause. The laws may have been there inadvertently or as
a result of inertia, and many state legislatures seemed not
to have realized that children could be executed under their
statutes. Such laws, moreover, were virtually never enforced
against minors under sixteen. Hence, the Justice reasoned,
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they were invalid. But if states reenacted them, consciously
and clearly, the Court would then have to consider whether
the statutes could actually meet the Clause's requirements. Id.
at 857, 108 S.Ct. at 2710–11 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
Perhaps the most dramatic instance of this constitutional
remand, or second look, approach *740 occurred in our own
Circuit, in a case bearing many similarities to the one before
us today. In Abele v. Markle, 342 F.Supp. 800 (D.Conn.1972)
(“Abele I ”), a three-judge district court was asked to examine
the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that banned
abortion. Circuit Judge J. Edward Lumbard found the statute
to be unconstitutional for reasons later echoed by the Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35
L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). District Judge T. Emmet Clarie found no
violation of due process for reasons akin to those adverted to
in today's majority opinion. The key vote was by then-District
Judge Jon Newman.
In his landmark opinion, now-Chief Judge Newman found
that the Connecticut statute had been passed in 1860 to protect
the health of pregnant women, and that this aim was no
longer applicable in 1972 because childbirth endangered a
woman's life more than abortion did. Id. at 807–09 (Newman,
J., concurring). Yet he recognized that other valid grounds for
the statute might exist, including, perhaps, the protection of
unborn life (Roe v. Wade had not yet been decided). Newman
pointed out, however, that the statute was not passed to protect
unborn life. “If the Connecticut legislature had made [such]
a judgment,” Newman mused, “the constitutionality of such
laws would pose a legal question of extreme difficulty....” Id.
at 810. Because “that legislative determination has not been
shown to have been made,” Newman found it “inappropriate
to decide the constitutional issue that would be posed” if the
Legislature in fact passed a law designed to protect human
life. Id. And since the statute before him, whatever its basis,
raised strong constitutional doubts, Newman nullified the law
while explicitly leaving the Legislature free to reconsider the
issue.
Judge Newman's opinion is, of course, not binding on us.
But it remains an important beacon suggesting what is the
correct approach in extremely difficult cases in which neither
the Supreme Court, nor constitutional language or tradition,
gives clear guidance. It tells us how to deal with situations
in which the state interests that might support such statutes

can only be inferred from legislative inaction or from longabandoned legislative motives.
Today, Timothy Quill takes the place of Janice Abele in
challenging another statute of nineteenth-century origin. As
with the Connecticut abortion law, the rationale for the
New York assisted-suicide prohibition has eroded with the
passage of time. In the nineteenth century, both suicide and
attempted suicide were crimes and assisting in those crimes
was, derivatively, a crime as well. But suicide and attempted
suicide are no longer crimes. Nevertheless, the prohibitions
on assisted suicide might serve other valid ends. It is possible,
for example, to imagine a state in which such statutes were
part of an overall approach to the preservation of life that
was so all-encompassing that the laws' validity might be
upheld despite their infringement of important libertarian
individual rights. Our Constitution gives us no more complete
dominion over our bodies than it does over our property.
See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct.
1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (holding that a state may, over a
suspect's protest, have a physician extract blood from a person
suspected of drunk driving). In other words, our Constitution
does not enact the bodily equivalent of Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics. Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75,
25 S.Ct. 539, 546–47, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). But there is no sign that such an overall “culture
of life” reigns in New York State—quite the contrary.
Well before Roe v. Wade, New York enacted one of the
most permissive abortion laws in the country. See Roe, 410
U.S. 113, 147–48 & n. 41, 93 S.Ct. 705, 724 & n. 41, 35
L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). New York recently reenacted the death
penalty. See Act of Mar. 7, 1995, ch. 1, § 2, 1995 N.Y.
Laws 1 (McKinney's) (codified at N.Y. Penal Law § 60.06
(McKinney's Supp.1996)). As far as I know, no New York
Legislature has seriously considered requiring individuals to
give their blood, bone marrow or other organs, to keep those
who need transplants alive. Indeed, such an idea would strike
many as bizarre science fiction. Nearer to hand, the right to
demand to die, as and when one wishes, has *741 been
recognized in New York for all those on feeding or hydration
tubes or on other life support devices. All this the majority
opinion demonstrates beyond peradventure.
Various amici for the respondents argue that the New York
assisted suicide laws consciously adopt their particular vision
of what life and death should be. Amicus United States
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Catholic Conference, for example, insists that suicide is
antithetical to freedom, that it is not voluntary and that it
is linked to psychiatric illness. But there is no reason to
believe that New York has accepted these arguments. If
it had, one would expect that New York would prohibit
attempted suicide and that it would, for example, aggressively
discourage suicide by the terminally ill, through legislative
declarations defining it to be a “grave public wrong” or
through some other means.
Other amici contend that the difference between what they
call “active” assisted suicide (making lethal drugs available
to those terminally ill who would self-administer them) and
what they call “passive” behavior (actively removing life
supports or feeding tubes, on demand, so that the patient may
die) is fundamental. Even if I were to accept the distinction
in the face of the powerful arguments made against it both
by the majority today and by Justice Scalia in his Cruzan
concurrence, there is no reason to believe that New York
has consciously made such a judgment. Certainly New York
has never enacted a law based on a reasoned defense of the
difference.
The Attorney General of New York contends that its
Legislature has, in fact, made just such a distinction by its
inaction, by its failure to remove the prohibitions before
us today. It left these in place after the prohibition on
what could be called “passive” assisted suicide had been
abrogated. Leaving aside the difficulties involved in arguing
that legislative inaction should be given the same weight
as legislative action in supporting the view that medical
action and medical inaction are fundamentally different, the
argument will not do. As the majority points out, we have
not been given any clear statements of possible interests that
the state actually believes would be served by the distinction.
In their absence, how can we say that the distinction, which
is anything but obvious, and which results in severe harm
to the ability of some, but not all, individuals to determine
crucial life and death choices for themselves, is mandated
by the state's fundamental needs? And if the state does not
affirmatively tell us what it wishes to put on the other side
of the scale, how can we make the balance required by
Cruzan come out any way but in favor of an individual's
freedom to choose between life and death? Whether under
Equal Protection, or Due Process, then, the absence of a
recent, affirmative, lucid and unmistakable statement of why
the state wishes to interfere with what has been held by the

Supreme Court to be a significant individual right, dooms
these statutes.
I take no position on what I would hold were such an
affirmative statement forthcoming from the state of New
York. In the wake of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–
40, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2727, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (per curiam),
which in effect sent all of the then-existing death penalty
laws back for a second look by the states, the Supreme Court
(rightly or wrongly) upheld most of the somewhat modified
and subsequently enacted death penalty laws. See Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–81, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2928–
29, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion). Conversely,
one month after Judge Newman's concurrence in Abele I,
Connecticut enacted a new anti-abortion law that was based
on protecting the life of the fetus. Pub. Act No. 1, 1972 Conn.
Acts 593 (May Spec.Sess.) (codified at Conn. Gen.Stat. §
53–30(a)–(b)). And the same panel that had decided Abele I
(rightly or wrongly) declared the new law unconstitutional. 15
Either result *742 is possible after a second look in which
the state affirms laws that it previously had allowed to remain
in force through passivity or inertia. 16 What I do say is
that no court need or ought to make ultimate and immensely
difficult constitutional decisions unless it knows that the
state's elected representatives and executives—having been
made to go, as it were, before the people—assert through
their actions (not their inactions) that they really want and are
prepared to defend laws that are constitutionally suspect.
15

See Abele v. Markle, 351 F.Supp. 224, 232
(D.Conn.1972) ( “Abele II ”). Then–District Judge
Newman's opinion noted that, “for the author of this
opinion,” the Legislature's new “statement of legislative
purpose makes the issue posed ... quite different from the
issue raised by the challenge to the prior statutes.... A
statute of this sort, as I previously indicated [in Abele I
], 342 F.Supp. at 810 and 811 n. 18, poses a far more
difficult question, one that I did not believe should be
decided unless such a statute was enacted.” Id. at 226
n. 4. Judge Newman's opinion was joined by Judge
Lumbard, while Judge Clarie dissented. The Supreme
Court subsequently vacated the decision in light of Roe,
410 U.S. 951, 93 S.Ct. 1417, 35 L.Ed.2d 683 (1973),
and remanded the case to the district court. On remand,
the same three judges declared the law unconstitutional.
Abele v. Markle, 369 F.Supp. 807, 809 (D.Conn.1973)
(per curiam).
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16

Sometimes, of course, a legislature will not reenact a
statute that has been remanded to it, or will reenact it with
modifications and limits sufficient to avoid any serious
constitutional challenge.

It is different when the Constitution speaks clearly. When
a law violates the plain mandates of the text, history, or
structure of the Constitution, no second look is warranted or
appropriate. That law must fall. Laws that violate the core
of the First Amendment and the core of the Takings Clause
are but two examples. When that is not the case, when the
Constitution and its history do not clearly render a statute
invalid, when its validity depends instead, in part, on the
strength of the state interests at stake, then a second look is
not only appropriate, it is, in my view, usually required.
Without a second look by the people, courts are liable to err
in either direction. They may uphold and thereby validate 17
(as they all too often have 18 ) the infringement of rights upon
which the states did not truly wish to encroach. Conversely,
they may, ultimately and definitively, strike down laws,
believing that the state interests involved are minor, when in
fact these interests turn out to be highly significant. 19
17

See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE
AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A
DEMOCRACY 52 (1960) (“[T]he Court, through its
history, has acted as the legitimator of the government.
In a very real sense, the Government of the United States
is based on the opinions of the Supreme Court.”).

18

See Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term
—Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional
Accountability (What the Bork–Brennan Debate
Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REVV. 80, 143–45 (1991).

19

See Harry Wellington, Common Law Rules and
Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on
Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973); Alexander
Bickel & Harry Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the
Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L.
REVV. 1 (1957); Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court,
1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REVV. 40 (1961).

In the end, a constitutional remand does no more than this: It
tells the legislatures and executives of the various states, and
of the federal government as well, that if they wish to regulate
conduct that, if not protected by our Constitution, is very close

to being protected, they must do so clearly and openly. They
must, in other words, face the consequences of their decision
before the people. 20 Unless they do this, they cannot *743
expect courts to tell them whether what they may or may not
actually wish to enact is constitutionally permitted.
20

In this respect, the notion of a constitutional remand
may respond to some of the concerns expressed by
the dissenters in Companion in Dying. See Compassion
in Dying, 79 F.3d at 856 (Beezer, J. dissenting)
(“Whether the charitable or uncharitable characterization
[of physician-assisted suicide] ultimately prevails is a
question that must be resolved by the people through
deliberative decisionmaking in the voting booth ...
This issue we, the courts, need not—and should not—
decide.... To declare a constitutional right to physicianassisted suicide would be to impose upon the nation
a repeal of local laws.”); id. at 857 (Fernandez, J.,
dissenting) (“Like so many other issues, it is one ‘for the
people to decide.’ Our Constitution leaves it to them; it
is they and their representatives who must grapple with
the riddle and solve it.”) (citation omitted); id. at 857
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (“The Founding Fathers did
not establish the United States as a democratic republic
so that elected officials would decide trivia, while all
great questions would be decided by the judiciary.... That
an issue is important does not mean that the people,
through their democratically elected representatives, do
not have the power to decide it.”). See also 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991); CAN. CONSTT. (Constitution Act, 1982),
pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) §
33 (containing the Non–Obstante Clause that permits
legislature to abrogate rights, but only if the legislature
explicitly decides to do so).

IV. Conclusion
For all of the above reasons, I do not reach the merits in
this case—merits that are, as Judge Newman said of those
that he also did not reach in Abele v. Markle, “of extreme
difficulty.” 342 F.Supp. at 810. What, after all, are we to make
of Margaret Mead's statement, cited in one of the amicus
briefs, that we should beware of giving those who have
the power to heal the right to kill, since anthropologically
speaking the distinction between the two is relatively new in
our cultures? It is certainly worth pondering. But how does
it help us to distinguish between giving doctors the right to
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remove life support systems and the right of the terminally
ill to demand lethal drugs from the same doctors? And how
is one to weigh petitioners' claim that if doctors are not
allowed to give patients lethal drugs for self-administration,
those patients will be forced to commit suicide, legally, in
far more horrendous ways—by hanging, shooting, or gassing
themselves? These methods, petitioners assert, are plausibly
more dangerous to society and devastating to survivors. But
is it really the case that terminally ill patients would take such
measures? And which way would it cut, if they did not? These
questions, moreover, hardly begin to approach the human
tragedies, and the deeply held beliefs, that the issues we would
have to decide would require us to explore. No. Unless New
York forces us to face such choices head on, by asserting its
interest in the prohibitions before us, we should not do so.
And this New York has not done.

Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution to the extent
that these laws are interpreted to prohibit a physician from
prescribing lethal drugs to be self-administered by a mentally
competent, terminally ill person in the final stages of that
terminal illness. I would, however, take no position on
whether such prohibitions, or other more finely drawn ones,
might be valid, under either or both clauses of the United
States Constitution, were New York to reenact them while
articulating the reasons for the distinctions it makes in
the laws, and expressing the grounds for the prohibitions
themselves. I therefore concur in the result reached by the
Court.

All Citations
80 F.3d 716, 64 USLW 2620

I would hold that, on the current legislative record, New
York's prohibitions on assisted suicide violate both the
End of Document
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